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Since the reform and open more than 30 years ago，China has achieved the 
magnificent economical achievement, which is honored as the economic miracle.  
But simultaneously China economy is also following the imperfect market economy 
system foundation, such as financial institution, legal regime, property right 
protection system. This is called institution paradox, which couldn’t explained by 
standard west economic theory. It is said that China economy is different with the 
economic textbook unorthodox growth way. This article is for the purpose to decrypt 
China economy to provide a theory explanation.     
This article tells us that the key to untie the riddle topic is the local government.  
The close relations between government and economy have already obtained the 
general economical scholar's approval. China's economic growth is considered “the 
government leading economy”. The government is division by the level. The one 
who are responsible for the national management and policy execution specifically 
are all levels of local governments.  China's high speed economic growth displays 
not only in the national stratification plane, but also in various local stratification 
plane. China's economy in fact is “the local authority leading economy”. The reason 
that the local government can impel the high speed local economic growth, is the 
mutual economic competition which launches for the political economic interest 
among local governments. Henceforth, this article have provided a complete 
explanation frame  for China's high speed economic growth and the system 
paradox. 
Specifically speaking, this article unties the riddle topic gradually like this: 
Chapter 3 has analyzed local government's benefit pattern and objective 
function in detail, and pointed out that most rational choice factor of the local 
government under the multiple benefit patterns is the GDP growth. Afterward this 
article considered the local government competition as the Chinese economy 
predominant factor, discussed the occurrence mechanism of local government 















detail four local government competition ways and dual effects. The dual effect's 
analyses had also proven that  China's economy is truly the local government 
leading. This article tributed local government competition to the “public investment 
competition” succinctly, through understanding “public goods” and extending the 
concept of investment.  This understanding unified the local government behavior 
and the standard western economic growth theory, which can not only explain the 
current local government act, but also provided the instruction for present's local 
government competition reforming. 
The chapter 4 analyzed the microscopic mechanism of local government 
competition, which are the government governance and the official incentive.  The 
local government competition is a macroscopic explanation platform, whose behind 
logic must seek from the microscopic view. The government governance is the 
answer.  This article outlined the government govern theory drawing lessons from 
the company governance, then constructed a Chinese economic growth government 
governance frame, mainly including administrative contract system based on the 
possession management, the financial decentralization, the political promotion 
tournament, the special relations between government and business, the bureaucrat 
culture and so on five factors. And most core factor is political promotion 
tournament mechanism. From this, the article extended the explanation economic 
growth theory branch - - incentive theory of growth which emerged gradually.   
The chapter 5 deepened the government governance frame, analyzed the  
institutional  factor of  government governance. This research is not only helpful 
to understand clearly institutional foundation of economic growth, can also for 
explaining China's institutional imperfect. Official's incentive which cause political 
promotion tournament, comes from the cadres and personnel system reform. This 
chapter first analyzed the cadre personnel system vicissitude, proposeing “the 
government human capital”, then integrated the system factor into the standard 
growth model, proved further local government's function in institutional change in 
detail.    















institutional change's way.  All institutional changes are induced institutional 
changes. From the logic of induced institutional change theory, this article used “the  
institutional hysteresis” to explain China's system question.  This article analyzed 
occurrence principle of institutional hysteresis, also proposed measurement criterias 
which are the static  resources deployment efficiency and the dynamic compatible 
efficiency.  We could divided institutional hysteresis into matching institutional 
hysteresis and non-matching institutional hysteresis using the two measurement 
criterias. The China’s institutional hysteresis belonged to the later. Simultaneously 
this article further pointed out that our country's political economical malpractice 
including the negative effect which caused by the local government competition 
come from the anomie of government governance and even the institutional 
hysteresis.   
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